The employment and earnings effects of the state-oriented federal welfare reform legislation of 1996 have been extensively studied using either survey or administrative data. Because information may differ substantially across these sources, it is difficult both to identify the true effects of these interventions and to compare evaluation estimates of these interventions that rely on these different data sources. This paper uses data gathered as part of the Wisconsin Child Support Demonstration Evaluation to examine the extent to which administrative (unemployment insurance) and survey records on employment and earnings for a sample of low-skilled women are congruent. Our findings suggest that there are substantial differences in both mean earnings and mean employment rates between survey and unemployment insurance (UI) data. We identify the extent to which these disparities can be explained by differences between these data sources in the definition of earnings or the method of data collection. We also examine the differences between UI and survey sources in estimates of employment and earnings growth among low-skilled women.
Introduction
For reasons that are not well understood, welfare receipt and welfare income have been increasingly underreported in national surveys. While underreporting of welfare receipt has always been a problem in national surveys, it has grown worse since states began implementing Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) programs in 1997 [?] . Additionally, even if national surveys accurately measured welfare receipt (as they were designed to do in larger states before welfare reform), it seems doubtful that state-level comparisons would be reliable given the dramatic decrease in caseloads -from over 5 million to about 2 million -since 1994.
Because of these difficulties associated with national survey data, researchers have turned to state-level survey and administrative data to evaluate the impacts of welfare reform and to monitor the post-reform outcomes for target populations. One common form of data consists of cross-sectional or longitudinal surveys administered to a subset of a state's caseload that collect information on earnings, employment, demographic characteristics, and living arrangements. A second source of information is from state administrative data containing work and earnings information gathered as part of employers' reports to the Unemployment Insurance System (UI).
The potential existence of two sources of information on individual-level earnings for individual states makes it difficult to compare results within and across states. In this paper, we explore the extent of differences in individual employment and earnings measures between those collected as part of a careful survey of 2,200 welfare-oriented women in Wisconsin and those reported by employers to the UI system. Both sources of data are available through a unique experimental research project undertaken at the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Wisconsin Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE).
In the CSDE project, single, low-skilled female resident parents in the state of Wisconsin who receive or have received welfare cash assistance are studied over time in an effort to assess their behavioral responses to a specific reform in child support policy. In the study, 100 percent of the child support paid by noncustodial parents is passed through to the treatment group, and 41 percent to a maximum of $50 per month is passed through to the control group. The CSDE survey is comprehensive, inquiring about a variety of individual choices and living arrangements, in addition to socioeconomic and demographic information. Information on the extent of work in a particular year and the earnings associated with that work is sought for each respondent. Uniquely, the survey also inquires about a detailed set of work-related attributes, such as the nature of the payments made (e.g., wages, tips, or the receipt of monetary payments from odd jobs), and the number of jobs held in a year. We use this information in analyzing the potential sources of differences in reports of work and earnings between the survey and the administrative UI data. 1 The project also obtained detailed information on the work and earnings of each covered person included in the program from employer reports compiled by the Wisconsin Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, which indicate whether a person has worked during a quarter and their quarterly earnings.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 through IV we examine differences in the definitions of work and earnings between the survey and UI reports and in the data collection methods. These differences suggest a number of reasons for discrepancies between work and earnings reports in the two data sources, and between these information sources and some unknown 'true' value of earnings. Data from the two sources reveal the extent of the discrepancies between them. In Section 4 we use information available in the CSDE survey regarding the personal characteristics, location, extent of welfare use, and job characteristics of the workers in our sample 1 The CSDE survey is unique in its efforts to secure reliable information on work and earnings responses. The special circumstances of low-skilled women are reflected in explanations of the questions asked of survey respondents regarding the nature and extent of their work and earnings. In seeking information about earnings, it was explained that the question referred to "the total income you earned from all jobs combined during . . . [the year]". The respondent was explicitly told to exclude any money that was received from the public workforce/welfare agency, even though that payment required a specific amount of work. Self-employment was explained, and respondents were told that income from this activity is also to be included. In cases where the respondent reported not knowing her income in a particular year, the interviewer was advised to "probe for the best estimate."
to examine the correlates of the work and earnings discrepancies and the extent to which our conjectures regarding the sources of these discrepancies are able to explain the observed patterns. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 explore the extent to which the use of survey or UI data affects empirical estimates of the determinants of employment and earnings and estimates of the levels and changes in these variables across groups of workers. Section 7 concludes.
Sources of earning and employment differences in survey and UI records
Relative to some unknown 'true' employment and earnings values there are reasons to suspect under-and over-reporting in both survey data and UI reports. UI earnings and employment may be underreported, reflecting potential incentives for both employees and employers to underreport earnings together with the difficulty in tracking some sources of income. For example, while the full amount of receipts of each employee's tips, bonuses, and commissions are required to appear in employer reports to the UI system, the incentives to underreport, combined with the difficulty of tracking income from these sources, make it likely that they are consistently underreported. Underreporting also exists because some employment categories are exempt from UI reporting requirements (e.g., self-employed workers, farm laborers, domestic workers, and some part-time employees of nonprofit institutions). It is estimated that UI records cover about 91 percent of Wisconsin workers. Workers may be falsely classified into these exempt categories, resulting in underreports of both earnings and employment in the UI data. Underreports in the UI data can also occur because the earnings of workers residing in one state and working in another are unlikely to be reported by the employer to the UI system in the state of the employee's residence.
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The UI reporting system may also contain erroneous work and earnings information due to errors in recording Social Security numbers or in matching UI wage records. These errors may reflect intentional or non-intentional noncompliance. Finally, it is worth noting that aggregating quarterly UI earnings to an annual earnings measure will tend to exacerbate the measurement problems described above. Overall, the combined effect of these sources of potential bias suggests that UI employment and earnings measures are likely to be lower than 'true' earnings values.
Although most jobs are covered by the UI system, both employment and earnings for low-wage workers may be seriously underreported in UI reports. Relying on an extensive audit of a sample of 875 Illinois firms in 1987, Blakemore et al. [?] and Burgess, Blakemore, and Low [?] collectively conclude that about 45 percent of employers failed to report earnings of some UI covered employees, 13.6 percent of their covered workers had no reports, and 4.2 percent of wages were excluded. These underreports were concentrated among smaller firms; for firms with less than 5 workers, 56.5 percent of workers and 14.1 percent of earnings were unreported during the third quarter of 1987. The incorrect classification of some workers as uncovered independent contractors and high employee turnover accounted for much of the underreporting of work and earnings. Nearly half of all unreported workers were improperly classified by their employers as independent contractors [?] . Because firms are responsible for paying UI taxes on employees up to an earnings threshold, those with high turnover must pay taxes on a larger portion of their total payroll; as a result, they are more likely to underreport workers and earnings [?] .
Individual survey responses regarding work and earnings may also have errors. Employment and earnings from illegal activities, irregular work, odd jobs or reciprocal tasks for friends, family and neighbors tend to be underreported in survey responses. To the extent that respondents view the survey as an instrument for obtaining information that may affect them adversely, survey information will understate the true level of employment and earnings. For example, all of the women included in the sample were welfare recipients at some point during late 1997 or 1998, during which time Wisconsin had a 100 percent tax rate on the earnings of welfare recipients. Finally, error may arise from survey responses regarding work and earnings in the distant past or for periods of intermittent activity, and from the imputing of earnings values for workers who report that they do not know their earnings. Several studies have attempted to describe the extent of measurement problems in survey data by matching records from a survey (the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or March Current Population Survey) with 'true' earnings measures [6, 7] . These studies indicate that there are substantial individual-level differences between survey and 'true' earnings, but that this measurement error does not result in substantial biases in estimated coefficients from earnings regressions. In these studies, the 'true' value of earnings is taken to be earnings from payroll records of a large unionized manufacturing firm [7] or earnings from Social Security Administration (SSA) records [7,?] . We note that these 'true' earnings measures are themselves subject to error. For example, firm payroll records neglect earnings from second jobs, and SSA records exclude earnings from informal sector work.
Abowd and Stinson [?] also note that these sources of 'true' earnings are themselves measured with error. Using matched earnings data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and employers' W-2 reports, they investigate the extent of measurement error in both sources of data. They find that there is a substantial degree of measurement error in both SIPP earnings data and the matched administrative earnings data, but that the ratio of true variation to measurement error is actually lower for the SIPP earnings reports.
A number of studies have made direct comparisons between survey earnings measures and UI measures for low-skilled populations. Using a sample of Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) experiment participants that contained both UI and survey earnings, Kornfeld and Bloom [14] found substantial differences in individual-level and mean earnings. Twenty-six percent of adult men and nearly 15 percent of adult women had quarterly survey and UI earnings values that varied by more than $1,000; mean survey earnings were approximately 30 percent higher than mean UI earnings for both groups. Despite large mean and individual-level differences in survey and UI earnings, estimates of the impact of JTPA training were not substantially affected by which earnings measure was used.
4
There are also a number of studies of women who exited state welfare programs that relied on both survey and UI measures of employment and earnings. 5 As in the Kornfeld and Bloom study, survey-based employment rates and earnings exceed those from administrative data. One difficulty with many of these state-level studies is that the comparability of survey and UI employment and earnings measures are questionable because the time frames covered by the surveys differ from those covered by the UI reports. 6 The CSDE survey that we analyze avoids this problem, as earnings are measured annually, allowing comparability with UI records.
Discrepancies in employment reports
The most basic indicator of labor market performance is whether or not a person is employed during a specific period of time. For the 2,179 women in our sample, job-holding at any time during 1998 is recorded in both the survey and the UI data. For the UI data, we regard observations with positive UI earnings during any quarter of 1998 as working during that year. 6 For example, one study of welfare leavers compares quarterly UI employment and earnings (pre-exit to 4 months post-exit) to point-in-time survey records of employment and monthly earnings 12 to 18 months post-welfare exit. See Arizona Department of Income Security [1] . Additionally, UI employment is measured quarterly while survey employment is usually measured at a point in time. these discrepancies are due to having UI, but no survey, reports of earnings. Because of these discrepancies, the survey and UI reports indicate quite different employment rates -83 percent using the UI data and 74 percent from the survey reports. It will be helpful for our further analysis to distinguish the groups in the various cells of Table 1 . We label the 1,514 women in the first row/first column as sure workers because they are employed according to both data sources. Relying on the same rationale, we label the women in the second row/second column as sure nonworkers. Because the women in the first row/second column report some earnings in the survey, we classify them as probable workers, even though no employer report of earnings is recorded in the UI data. Because we know from employer reports that the 305 women in the second row/first column were working in 1998 in spite of their own reports of non-employment, we refer to them as false nonworkers, and conclude that these women either forgot that they had worked or misrepresented their earnings to survey interviewers.
Discrepancies in earnings reports
Consistent with the disparities in alternative reports of employment, large differences exist between earnings reported by CSDE sample respondents and earnings reported by employers in accordance with UI reporting requirements. UI earnings, there is a strong positive relationship between the series. The sample correlation between survey and UI earnings is 0.66 for the entire sample, and 0.65 among the sure workers. Figure 2 provides another view of these disparities for the separate groups of women in our sample. Mean levels of S and UI and the S -UI earnings difference for each group are shown in the figure. Sure workers are shown in the positive quadrant of the figure, and we distinguish workers for whom the absolute value of the earnings difference exceeds $2,500 from those for whom the difference lies within $2,500 of the 45-degree line. We selected $2,500 value because the range minus $2,500 and $2,500 correspond roughly to the 5 th and 95 th percentiles of the S -UI earnings difference. The 88 probable workers are shown on the left side of the figure; they have positive S earnings but no UI earnings. Forty of these probable workers report S earnings of more than $2,500, while having reported UI earnings of zero. Average S earnings for this group of 40 women are over $10,500. The 305 false nonworkers are shown at the bottom of the diagram. There are 115 of these women who indicate no S earnings but for whom employers report average UI earnings of more than $2,500. Employer-reported earnings for this group of false nonworkers with UI earnings above $2,500 average nearly $7,500. 
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Summary Measures by of S and UI Earnings by Earnings Group
Survey Earnings In order to assess the degree of divergence between S and UI earnings we use two measures of the discrepancy between the two values -the mean absolute difference (MAD) and the mean squared difference (MSD). The MSD is the mean squared difference between S and UI earnings; it is also equal to the variance of the difference between S and UI earnings around zero. Like all measures of variance, the MSD can be decomposed into systematic and random components, a property that we exploit below. Table 2 reports average S and UI earnings by employment group, the fraction of the sample in each group, the two discrepancy indicators, and the percentage of both the total absolute discrepancy ( |S i − U I i |) and the total squared discrepancy (
2 ) attributable to each employment group. The top bank of Table 2 indicates significant variation in the extent of the earnings discrepancy across the groups of workers. For example, the MAD for sure workers is $2,894, compared to $3,310 for false nonworkers, and $5,480 for those who report having worked but who have no employer reports of earnings (probable workers). For the average sure worker the mean value of S exceeds that of UI by nearly $1,200, or by 18 percent. While sure workers comprise about 69 percent of all observations, they account for 75 percent of the total absolute discrepancy and 71 percent of the total squared discrepancy. The bottom bank of Table 2 shows the distribution of MAD and MSD across five categories of sure workers. Sure workers with absolute earnings differences of less than $2,500 have a MAD of only $851. While they comprise over 66 percent of the sample of sure workers, they account for only 20 percent of the total absolute discrepancy among these workers, and but 3 percent of the total squared discrepancy. On the other hand, the 23 percent of sure workers for whom S exceeds UI by more than $2,500 have a MAD of over $7,000 and account for 59 percent of the sure worker total absolute discrepancy, and for 73 percent of the sure worker total mean squared discrepancy. The 10 percent of sure workers for whom UI exceeds S by more than $2,500 have a MAD of about $6,000, and also account for a disproportionate share of both the total absolute discrepancy and the total squared discrepancy.
The last two categories divide sure workers into steady and unsteady workers. The 509 steady workers are those who worked at least 3 quarters in 1998 and had no more than two employers according to both UI records and the survey. As the numbers in Table 2 indicate, steady workers have higher average earnings than unsteady sure workers, probable workers, or false nonworkers. Despite their high levels of earnings, steady workers have lower levels of earnings discrepancy than other groups of workers. The MAD for steady workers is $2,626 compared with $3,029 for the unsteady workers. The difference in the MSD between steady and unsteady workers is more striking. Steady workers have a MSD of 18.83 million compared with 27.64 million for other sure workers.
The distribution of the algebraic difference between S and UI earnings (S-UI) among all sample members is shown in Table 3 .
7 Also shown is an approximation to the distribution of the earnings difference from a sample of women who were Job Training Partnership Act trainees reported by Kornfeld and Bloom [14] . 8 There is substantial conformity between our estimates of the S-UI discrepancies and those of Kornfeld-Bloom. For both samples, 45-50 percent of the observations have an earnings discrepancy of less than $800, and about 30 percent of the observations report survey earnings that exceed UI earnings by more than $2,400. However, while about 8 percent of the women in our sample have UI earnings that exceed survey earnings by more than $4,000, only about 3 percent of the observations in the Kornfeld-Bloom sample have (S-UI) values greater than $4,000.
The distribution of the (S-UI) discrepancy for the subsample of sure workers is similar to that for the entire sample, although the subsample of sure workers has larger fraction of observations with survey earnings substantially in excess of UI earnings. 8 Kornfeld and Bloom provide quarterly earnings estimates for their sample of women. We have 'annualized' their estimates by multiplying their quarterly earnings class intervals by four, hence forcing comparability with our annual values. 9 One possible explanation for the thicker and longer bottom tail of the distribution of the earnings difference for the workers in our sample may be the creation of annual S earnings values for the KornfeldBloom observations by multiplying quarterly values by a factor of 4. Because problems of recall are smaller in quarterly than in annual survey data, the distribution of quarterly earnings is likely to show less 
Evaluating some conjectures concerning the sources of earnings discrepancy
As we have noted, a variety of differences in concept, definition, and reporting procedures between the survey and the UI data system may contribute to the discrepancies between S and UI earnings reports. Other factors also contribute to the discrepancies, such as the likelihood of working in the informal sector, being an irregular (unsteady) worker, or respondent reports of difficulty in recalling earnings information. In Table 4 , we indicate several conjectures regarding the source and magnitude of the earnings discrepancy between the S and UI data.
The CSDE survey provides detailed information that allows us to explore the impact of a number of these factors on the survey-UI earnings discrepancy. For example, in addition to providing extensive information on demographic variables, the CSDE survey identifies the receipt of income from odd jobs, tips, and commissions. We can also identify those respondents who indicate that they "don't know" their precise earnings, and those for whom estimates of these 'unknown' values must be imputed. Information describing the welfare and work histories of the observations obtained from administrative data has been merged to the survey data. This information dispersion than the distribution of annual earnings for these same observations. Hence, the distribution of discrepancies between S and UI is likely to be smaller for the annualized Kornfeld-Bloom data than for the annual data on women in our sample. Moreover, the types of errors made in quarterly reporting are likely to be compounded in annual surveys, and reports of annual earnings reflect larger intertemporal employment variation than is present over a quarter. Second, the Kornfeld -Bloom numbers are from a sample of women that volunteered for training associated with the Job Training Partnership Act, whereas the sample used in our analysis is composed of women who were on welfare at some point during late 1997 or early 1998. All else equal, the workers in the Kornfeld-Bloom sample are likely to have a greater attachment to the formal sector of the labor force than the workers in our sample, and hence a smaller discrepancy between S and UI. 
Because individuals living out of state, or in a border county, are more likely to be working out of state, and because non-Wisconsin employers are not likely to report earnings to the Wisconsin UI system, survey earnings will be higher than UI earnings, leading to larger discrepancies. 5. Steady workers-those with earnings in at least 3 quarters of the year, and with no more than two employers or jobs during the year-will have smaller discrepancies, all else equal.
Workers with continuous work on a few jobs or for few employers are more likely to provide reliable earnings reports to survey interviewers.
6. Respondents who indicate that they "don't know" their earnings (and for whom an imputed value is provided) will have larger discrepancies than those who do respond to the earnings question, all else equal.
Respondents indicating that they don't know their earnings in 1998 are more likely to report their earnings to surveyors with error (either intentionally or unintentionally). Additionally, errors introduced in the imputation process may increase the discrepancy. 7. On average, those whose last quarter of employment was early in the year will have larger discrepancies than those who worked in the last quarter of the year, all else equal.
Those whose last quarter of employment was far from the date of the survey are likely to forget their prior year's earnings, and to report them with error. a Concealing work activities may take two forms. Recipients may be inclined to underreport (or to not report) their earnings to surveyors if they believe this information will result in adverse administrative decisions such as loss of benefits. In this case UI earnings would be higher than survey earnings, all else equal. Alternatively, recipients may provide false Social Security numbers to employers in an attempt to disguise their earnings. Assuming these earnings are reported to surveyors, such concealment would lead to higher survey than UI earnings, all else equal.
includes the number of months respondents received cash welfare assistance through AFDC in the two years prior to being assigned to Wisconsin's TANF program, and the fraction of 1998 calendar year that respondents received cash assistance. Finally, the survey also contains information on the county of residence for each respondent, the number and characteristics of jobs/employers during the year, and the nature of job and payment arrangements. File: jem287.tex; BOKCTP/wyy p. 12
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Correlates of being a false nonworker
We first estimate a multinomial logit model to identify factors that are related to whether survey respondents are false nonworkers (those with positive UI earnings but no survey earnings), probable workers, or sure workers. 10 For this estimation we use the 1,907 observations that fall into one of these 3 groups. False nonworkers are of particular interest as they apparently either forgot that they worked in 1998, or intentionally misreported their work status. Because many of these women have perceived incentives to hide their earnings, some of them may have intentionally misreported their earnings. We found that average UI earnings for false nonworkers is $3,310. Table 5 presents the results of this estimation. The coefficients show the relative risk (or odds) ratio associated with a unit change in each of the independent variables; coefficients greater (less) than one indicate a larger risk of falling into the indicated group relative to the reference group by a factor equal to the coefficient. Because false nonworkers and probable workers are lacking reports of either S or UI earnings or employment, the specification is parsimonious. For example, in the case of false nonworkers, the characteristics of the job obtained from the survey (e.g., hourly or salary basis, receipt of tips and commissions) are unreported. In the case of probable workers characteristics of employment obtained from the UI records, such as the number of employers, are not available.
Women with low education levels are more likely to be false nonworkers than are those with more schooling. Although Hispanics (and other non-whites and nonblacks) are much less likely to be in the sure worker category than whites, they are as likely to be a probable worker as a false nonworker. Aside from this effect, raceethnicity does not appear to effect worker group status. Residing in an urban area (Milwaukee or another urban area) also appears to be associated with being a false nonworker; however, neither of these variables is statistically significant at standard levels. While residing outside of Wisconsin for part of the year seems likely to reduce employer reports of work and earnings (and, hence, to increase the likelihood of being a probable worker relative to the other categories), the effect of this variable is not statistically significant.
By far the largest determinate of having some missing source of earnings information is the fraction of 1998 during which cash assistance is received. Being on cash assistance for all of the year, compared with none of it, increases the likelihood of being a false nonworker (relative to the other two categories), consistent with the perceived incentive to hide earnings among women receiving welfare. Welfare receipt also increases the likelihood of being a probable worker relative to a sure worker, consistent with the incentive to hide income, perhaps through the use of non-matched Social Security numbers. The magnitude of this effect is very large. If the entire sample of workers were on cash assistance for all of 1998, we predict that 35 percent of them would be false nonworkers and 6 percent of them would be probable workers, compared to the 16 and 3 percent who are actually in these categories. Conversely, if none of the workers in this sample received welfare in 1998, we would expect 90 percent of them to be sure workers, compared to the observed 80 percent, with the bulk of this 10 percentage-point decrease being due to a reduced fraction of false nonworkers.
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Because Wisconsin taxes the earnings of welfare recipients at 100 percent, the question arises whether the large impact of welfare recipiency on the likelihood of being a false nonworker or probable worker arises from intentional misrepresentation of earnings by respondents. While it is impossible to answer this question with certainty, we can shed some light on this issue. If false nonworker status is due to intentional misrepresentation, we would expect false nonworkers (who report no survey earnings) to be more likely to have a positive UI earnings report in the quarters that they received cash assistance than sure workers. However, this is not the case, as false nonworkers are in fact less likely to have UI earnings in quarters in which they received cash assistance (about 52 percent of such quarters) than are sure workers (66 percent of such quarters). 
Correlates of the discrepancy between earnings reports among sure workers
We also estimate a multivariate regression to explore the consistency of our conjectures with earnings discrepancies between S and UI reports. The regression is run over the sample of sure workers with the aim of identifying the sources of the discrepancy among workers who have positive earnings reports in both data sources. The dependent variable measuring the earnings discrepancy is the difference between S and UI earnings (S-UI)/1000; with this specification, each coefficient (x 1,000) is interpreted as the change in the difference between S and UI earnings associated with a unit change in the indicated characteristic.
In Table 6 we present the results of our regression of (S-UI)/1000 on individual socioeconomic characteristics, the work and welfare history variables, and a set of variables designed to reflect our conjectures (e.g., location, welfare receipt, intermittent or informal employment, job characteristics, and the elapsed time since last worked). 11 As noted, the percent of 1998 that the worker receives welfare also increases the likelihood of being a probable worker relative to being a sure worker. This effect is such that 2 percent of the sample would be probable workers conditional on none of the sample being on welfare in 1998, compared to 6 percent in the actual sample.
12 Ideally we would like to determine whether false nonworkers were more likely to have UI earnings in the months in which they received cash assistance. Because employer reported UI earnings are only available on a quarterly basis we cannot compare monthly welfare receipt to monthly UI earnings. Consider first the conjecture that individuals who have worked for an out-of-state employer have a large discrepancy. Two of the variables in the model allow us to assess this conjecture. If the conjecture is correct, then respondents who report living out of state for some portion of 1998 are likely to have reduced UI earnings relative to survey earnings. Additionally, we might also expect that some respondents living in border counties would have some earnings that did not appear in UI records because these earnings were paid by out-of-state employers. The estimates in Table 6 support this conjecture, indicating that both living out of state in 1998 and residing in a border county lead to higher (S-UI) earnings differences. The effect of living out of state in 1998 is not statistically significant, but the effect of residing in a border county is.
13 13 It appears that most of this border county effect can be attributed to Kenosha County, an urban county located in the southeast corner of Wisconsin bordering populous Lake County, Illinois, and accounting for a large share of the state's public assistance caseload. Lake County, Illinois, is just to the north of Cook County, Illinois, which contains the city of Chicago. In a separate analysis available from the authors upon request, border county status was interacted in the state that the county bordered and included in the Table 6 specifications. This analysis indicates that there is a large positive effect of living in a county bordering Illinois on the survey -UI earnings difference, and that the effect of living in counties bordering other states is smaller and not statistically distinguishable from 0. When a separate control for Kenosha County was added to this model, the effect of living in a county bordering Illinois is reduced to the point that it is similar in magnitude and significance to the effect of living in a county bordering another state. We believe that the level of economic development in Lake County, Illinois, along with its close proximity
With respect to the nature of work and the sources of compensation, we hypothesized that earnings from tips, commissions, and odd jobs are likely to be undercounted in UI records relative to survey earnings. Consistent with this conjecture, the estimated effect of working an odd job in 1998 is to increase the (S-UI) earnings difference by approximately $670. The presence of income from tips and commissions is also estimated to increase the (S-UI) earnings difference, but the effect of this variable is not statistically different from zero at standard confidence levels.
Other conjectures concerned the role of being a steady worker (vs. a nonsteady worker), difficulty in recalling earnings because of intermittent employment, or having a long gap between the time of employment and the date of the survey, all of which suggest error in survey earnings, but no particular directional bias in the S-UI earnings difference. In the model reported in Table 6 , we included a dummy variable indicating being a steady worker.
14 The coefficient on this variable is large, negative, and statistically significant, suggesting that steady workers have a smaller (S-UI) earnings difference than do nonsteady workers. When the effects of this steady worker variable are netted out, there is little evidence that the number of quarters worked (reflecting intermittent work) or the time between the last quarter worked and the survey date 15 have a large impact on the (S-UI) earnings difference; the coefficients on both variables are relatively small and imprecisely estimated.
Although the number of quarters and last quarter worked in 1998 do not have statistically significant effects on the (S-UI) earnings difference, we predict higher survey earnings for a given level of UI earnings for workers that report that they "don't know" their earnings; the coefficient on this variable is large and statistically significant. We are unable to identify the extent to which this effect reflects difficulty in remembering earnings, our imputation procedure, 16 or intentional misrepresentation. Finally, consider the effect of the welfare receipt variable (the fraction of 1998 the respondent received cash assistance) on the difference between survey and UI earnings. Because the Wisconsin Works (W2) program does not allow recipients to work for pay and receive cash assistance, there is an incentive for women who wish to work and receive program benefits to attempt to conceal their earnings, even in cases where confidentiality is promised. In the survey, these incentives toward concealment may lead to underreporting of earnings. In the UI data the incentives toward concealment may lead to women working under false Social Security numbers, to Kenosha County, Wisconsin, provides opportunities for Kenosha County residents to work out of state that are not present in other border regions.
14 Recall that a steady worker is a sure worker who worked at least 3 quarters in 1998 according to UI records and who had no more than two employers according to both UI and survey records. 15 The 1998 CSDE survey was administered in the spring of 1999 to correspond with the time that many workers would be looking back over their earnings records for the purpose of filling out tax returns. Because there was a uniform period of survey administration, the last quarter worked in 1998 is a proxy for the time between when a worker was last employed and when she is asked to recall her earnings on the survey.
16 See footnote 13. Table 7 Tests The hypothesis that the set of coefficients are equal across the two data sources is rejected at the 5 percent level. *
The hypothesis that the set of coefficients are equal across the two data sources is rejected at the 10 percent level.
working off the books, or working odd jobs. Increased time on welfare in 1998 may lead to underreporting of both survey and UI earnings, meaning that its effect on (S-UI) is ambiguous. The coefficient in the model indicates a significant and positive effect of spending time on cash assistance on the (S-UI) earnings difference. In addition to the estimates shown in Table 6 , we also estimated a model excluding the work and welfare history variables. The coefficient estimates for this model are similar to those in the model shown in the table; a joint significance test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients in the two models are significantly different from each other. The model was also run over an analysis sample that excludes observations that indicated that they do not know their earnings, and for whom earnings values were imputed (see note 13). The results from this model are again very similar to those discussed in the paper, In sum, with but few exceptions, our conjectures regarding the sources of the discrepancy between survey and UI earnings reports are confirmed in these estimates.
Simulated effects of selected conjectures on the total discrepancy
The model reported in Table 6 can be used to simulate the quantitative contribution to the discrepancy between S and UI earnings of those factors expected to be related to this outcome. The discrepancy variable we use in this simulation is the MSD, and we simulate the percentage change in this variable attributable to each of the conjecture variables and to groups of these variables. Our simulation approach rests on the decomposition characteristics of the MSD measure, and is described in detail in Appendix A.
In our simulation, we set the variables of interest to values suggesting the absence of the expected effect (while holding all of the other variables at their observed levels) and record the estimated change in MSD. Our results, stated as the simulated percentage changes in MSD attributable to these alternative values of the conjecture variables are summarized below. Consistent with the conjectures, the presence of workers living in a border county increases the MSD, as does having an odd job, receiving tips and commissions, not being a steady worker, not knowing earnings, and last working prior to the third quarter of the year. Of the two conjecture variables for which the direction of the effect could be in either direction, having an overtime pay arrangement reduces the discrepancy, while assuming that no time is spent as a welfare recipient is associated with an increased MSD.
While this last finding seems counterintuitive, it has a sensible interpretation. Being on welfare during a year is associated with reduced earnings. For example, average survey and UI earnings for sample members who spent all of 1998 receiving cash assistance are $734 and $593, respectively, compared with $9,025 and $8,641 for sample members who spent none of 1998 receiving cash assistance. It follows that the absolute level of the survey-UI earnings discrepancy is also lower for those with low earnings relative to those with high earnings. Hence, simulating the effect of assuming that no worker was a welfare recipient results in both increased earnings levels and a greater level discrepancy between them.
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Using this same model, we also simulate the aggregate effect of two sets of conjecture variables on the mean squared discrepancy, one reflecting inadequacies in the UI measure and the other inadequacies in the survey measures; again, we set these variables at levels indicating the absence of the conjectured effect. The results are as follows:
-Variables reflecting the failure of UI to accurately capture earnings −2.65 percent (living in a border county or out of state, having an odd job or receiving tips/commissions) -Variables reflecting the failure of S to accurately capture earnings −7.51 percent (due to forgetting or misrepresentation, including not being a steady worker, having overtime pay arrangements, not knowing earnings, or last working prior to the third quarter of the year)
Overall, then, the variables that we have been able to study because of the detailed information available in the CSDE data account for about 10 percent of the total discrepancy. Factors that we are unable to measure -such as fixed difference in survey and UI reports not related to independent variables in the model, 18 simple random variation, or nonsystematic effects of the conjecture variables-account for the bulk of the total discrepancy.
For example, in addition to their systematic impacts on the discrepancy, the conjecture variables might influence the discrepancy by affecting the random component of either survey or UI earnings reports. To explore the extent to which nonsystematic 17 Given the importance of the level of survey and UI earnings in determining the discrepancy between the two values, it might be informative to estimate a model of the difference between log survey and log UI earnings. In such a model the independent variables would influence the percentage difference between survey and UI earnings, rather than the level difference between survey and UI earnings, by a constant amount. We estimated this model with the same set of independent variables as in the Table 6 specifications. While the estimated results were similar to those in Table 6 , and the accompanying simulations, the fraction of 1998 spent on cash assistance had a lower simulated effect on the mean of the squared difference in log survey and UI earnings than on the MSD. The results of these log difference regressions are available from the authors upon request.
18 The mean difference in survey and UI earnings accounts for about 6 percent of MSD.
effects of the conjecture variables increase the variability of earnings reports, and thus the discrepancy, we have regressed the squared residuals from the Table 7 regression on the independent variables. Two of the independent variables in this regression-the steady worker and the "don't know" variables-are statistically different from zero at standard confidence levels.
19 Being a steady worker leads to survey and UI reports that are more consistent, while not knowing earnings in 1998 leads to survey reports that are substantially less consistent. The magnitude of these effects is large. We estimate that MSD would be reduced by 26 percent if the entire sample of sure workers were steady workers.
20 MSD would be reduced by an additional 8.5 percent if none of the sure workers in the sample reported not knowing their earnings. Thus, a substantial amount of the noisy reporting of both S and UI earnings can be explained by the unsteady nature of work, problems of recall, or the misrepresentation of earnings by sample members.
Do employment and earnings functions vary by S and UI?
Given the nature of these observed discrepancies between survey and UI data, an important question is whether there is a significant difference in the conclusions obtained from equations estimated with these alternative variables. To answer this question, we estimated simple models of employment and earnings, using both data sources.
21 The independent variables in each of these equations are age, age squared (divided by 100), indicators of educational attainment (high school dropout, high school graduate, and some college), and indicators of race (white, black, Hispanic or other). These models are estimated over two samples: all women who appeared in the 1998 and 1999 surveys and sure workers that appeared in the 1998 and 1999 surveys.
We conducted an F-test of the equivalence of the coefficients (or sets of coefficients) across the two regressions for each group of women. These results are summarized in Table 7 . For the models using all of the observations, a substantial number of estimated relationships differ significantly between the survey and UI measures of earnings. In particular, significant differences between the coefficients on the education variable estimated using the alternative earnings variables are indicated; an F-test on the entire set of coefficients indicated significant differences in estimated effects depending on the earnings data used in estimation. These differences do not exist when the earnings functions are fit over only all sure workers; in no cell of Table 7 estimates fit over this group of workers are significant differences indicated. We conclude that estimates of the determinant earnings and employment are somewhat sensitive to the source of data of the dependent variable, especially for estimates fit over full samples of observations.
Do estimates of total and group-specific employment, earnings, and poverty status vary by S and UI?
Studies of low-income women, especially the numerous studies of welfare leavers [12] , monitor the employment and earnings of these workers over time in order to assess the effects of policy reform efforts. Both UI and survey information are used in these assessments of the performance of leavers. Our data allow us to estimate the extent to which these patterns vary by the source of the information used, ultimately aiding in reconciling information across different studies.
Because the monitoring studies often emphasize subgroup differences in employment and earnings, we present the (S-UI) differences in these variables for race and education subgroups using data on all respondents and all sure workers included in both the 1998 and 1999 surveys. We also show subgroup differences in estimates of earnings growth between the two sources of information.
Consider first the comparisons of employment rates shown in Table 8 . For all of the subgroups, the employment rate based on UI information exceeds that based on the survey data. The S/UI ratios range from 0.81 to 0.97, suggesting quite different patterns among the groups based on the source of information. For all subgroups, the patterns of change in employment rates from 1998 to 1999 based on survey data are larger (suggesting more growth or smaller decreases) than those based on UI information.
A similar pattern of differences in the level of earnings is shown in Tables 9 and  10 for all workers and sure workers, respectively. For all workers, the S/UI ratio of earnings ranges from 1.03 to 1.23 across the subgroups. For sure workers, S exceeds UI even more, and S/UI ranges 1.12 to 1.18 across the subgroups. For sure workers, earnings growth for all of the subgroups is greater when measured using UI information, but for all workers the S and UI differences in growth patterns vary across the subgroups.
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Overall, the use of survey information tends to understate employment levels but overstate earnings among low-skilled female workers, relative to information from administrative records. Survey-based employment rates tend to be about 90 percent of those based on administrative records. Conversely, earnings for sure workers estimated from survey-based information are about 16 percent higher than those based on UI data, and about 12 percent higher for all women. For sure workers, the ratios of survey to UI earnings are similar among the race-education subgroups, but vary substantially between subgroups when all workers are studied.
In terms of employment growth, use of survey information yields larger employment increases for all of the subgroups. However, earnings increases based on UI information tend to be larger than when survey information is used. For all workers the patterns of earnings growth among nonwhites without a high school diploma differ substantially across the S and UI data, but other groups show similar patterns of earnings growth across the two sources of earnings information. These results suggest that analysts tracking the employment and earnings growth of welfare leavers or other populations of low-skill workers need to interpret carefully the patterns that they observe.
Conclusions
Using data on a large sample of low-skill women with children, we find substantial disparities in employment and earnings reports between a uniquely high-quality survey of low-skilled workers and employer-based reports of earnings. These differences exist for both steady workers and those who work intermittently and on several jobs. Some of these differences are to be expected because of differences between the two data sources in coverage, definition, and the process of data collection.
We propose several "conjectures" for these discrepancies reflecting both the differences in definition and data collection between survey and UI information sources, and the location or job-related characteristics of the workers. Using information available in the survey, we measured the relationship of these worker and employment characteristics to the work and earnings discrepancies among the workers in the sample. Although the survey data are unique in the extent of detailed information regarding work and earnings patterns they provide, we were able to account for only File: jem287.tex; BOKCTP/wyy p. 22 24 about 10 percent of the total discrepancy; the great bulk of the discrepancy is due to random error in data reporting or recording or definitional or employment differences for which we are unable to account. Our estimates of the effect of the alternative data sources on both econometric estimates of the determinants of work and earnings outcomes and the reliability of measures of employment and earnings levels and trends (such as those reported in studies designed to monitor the labor market success of low-skill women, such as welfare leavers) suggest the need for caution by researchers in interpreting results from such studies.
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where M SD| x=x1 is the MSD with a subset of the independent variables set to specific values. 
